Abstract. A well-known cryptographic scenario is the following: a smart card wishes to compute an RSA signature with the help of an untrusted powerful server. Several protocols have been proposed to solve this problem, and many have been broken. There exist two kinds of attacks against such protocols: passive attacks (where the server follows the instructions) and active attacks (where the server may return false values). An open question in this eld is the existence of e cient protocols (without expensive precomputations) provably secure against both passive and active attacks. At Crypto '95, B eguin and Quisquater tried to answer this question by proposing an e cient protocol which was resistant against all known passive and active attacks. In this paper, we present a very e ective lattice-based passive attack against this protocol. An implementation is able to recover the secret factorization of an RSA-512 or RSA-768 key in less than 5 minutes once the card has produced about 50 signatures. The core of our attack is the basic notion of an orthogonal lattice which we introduced at Crypto '97 as a cryptographic tool.
Introduction
Small units like chip cards or smart cards have the possibility of computing, storing and protecting data. Today, some of these cards include fast and secure coprocessors allowing to quickly perform the expensive operations needed by public key cryptosystems. But most of the cards are cheap cards with too limited computing power for such tasks. To overcome this problem, extensive research has been conducted under the generic name \server-aided secret computations" (SASC). In the SASC protocol, the client (the smart card) wants to perform a secret computation (e.g., RSA signature generation) by borrowing the computing power of an untrusted powerful server without revealing its secret information. One distinguishes two kinds of attacks against such protocols: attacks where the server respects the instructions are called passive attacks, while attacks where the server may return false computations are called active attacks.
The rst SASC protocol was proposed by Matsumoto, Kato and Imai 9] in the case of RSA signatures 14]. P tzmann and Waidner 13] presented several passive attacks against all the protocols of 9], and Anderson 1] described an ecient active attack against one of the protocols of 9]. Several new protocols such as 8, 5, 4, 2, 7] have been proposed since. Among these, the protocol of B eguin and Quisquater 2] was quite attractive: it was relatively e cient (since it was based on the fast exponentiation algorithm due to Brickell, Gordon, McCurley and Wilson 3]), did not require expensive precomputations (contrary to most of the proposed protocols), and was secure against all known passive and active attacks, including some lattice-based passive attacks.
We present a very e ective lattice-based passive attack against this protocol. Our implementation shows that a server is able to recover the secret factorization of the RSA key (512, 768 or 1024 bits) in less than 5 minutes, once the card has produced about 50 signatures, for all the choices of parameters suggested by B eguin and Quisquater. To run the attack, the server needs to store very few information. The core of our attack is the basic notion of an orthogonal lattice which we recently introduced as a cryptographic tool in 10]. As in 10, 12, 11] , this technique enables us to use the linearity hidden in the protocol, and results in a simple heuristic attack which is devastating in pratice. An open question remains: does there exist a server-aided RSA signature protocol which is both e cient (without requiring expensive precomputations) and provably secure against passive and active attacks ?
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we make a short description of the B eguin-Quisquater server-aided RSA signature protocol. We refer to 2] for more details. In section 3, we recall some facts from 10] about the notion of an orthogonal lattice. Finally, we present our attack in section 4 and the experiments in section 5.
The B eguin-Quisquater Protocol
Let n = pq be a RSA public modulus with a secret exponent s and a public exponent v. We have sv 1 (mod (n)) with (n) = (p ? 1)(q ? 1). Denote bỳ (x) the bit-length of an integer x. Let t = max(`(p);`(q)) ? 1. In practice, one can assume that`(p) =`(q) = t + 1. Using the Extended Euclidean Algorithm, compute integers w p and w q less than n in absolute value such that w p +w q = 1, p divides w p and q divides w q . Thus, if y p y (mod p) and y q y (mod q) then y y p w q + y q w p (mod n). The protocol uses two integer parameters m and h, and is as follows:
1. The card receives M to sign. 8. The card sends p and q to the server.
9. The server computes and sends to the card y p = M p mod n and y q = M q mod n. 10 . The card computes S p = y p z p mod p and S q = y q z q mod q. 11. Next, the card computes S = w q S p + w p S q mod n. 12 . The card veri es M S v mod n. 13 . If the veri cation is correct, then the card transmits S.
In their paper 2], B eguin and Quisquater analyzed several passive and active attacks, including some lattice-based passive attacks. They concluded that their protocol was secure against all known passive and active attacks, for 4 di erent sets of parameters (valid for both RSA-512 and RSA-768), which are summarized in the following The resulting protocol was quite e cient. It only required about 30 modular multiplications for the card. The needed RAM and the data transfers between the card and the server were small, and the precomputations were not expensive.
The Orthogonal Lattice
We recall a few useful facts about the notion of an orthogonal lattice, which was introduced as a cryptographic tool in 10]. Let L be a lattice in Z n where n is any integer. The orthogonal lattice L ? is de ned as the set of elements in Z n which are orthogonal to all the lattice points of L, with respect to the usual dot product. We de ne the lattice L = (L ? ) ? which contains L and whose determinant divides the one of L. The results of 10] which are of interest to us are the following two theorems: In practice, one obtains a simple and very e ective algorithm (which consists of a single lattice reduction, described in 10]) to compute a reduced basis of the orthogonal lattice, thanks to the celebrated LLL algorithm 6]. This means that, given a low-dimensional L in Z n , one can easily compute many short and linearly independent vectors in L ? .
A Simple Attack
Throughout the attack, only steps 2, 3, 7 and 8 of the protocol will be of interest. 
The server knows p and q by step 8, but not s 1 . These vectors were also considered by B eguin and Quisquater when they analyzed some lattice-based passive attacks, but this is the only similarity between these attacks and the attack we present. We will see that short vectors orthogonal to p (resp. q )
give information on q (resp. p). If we nd enough such independent vectors, then q (resp. p) is revealed. Fortunately, the previous section shows that it is not hard to do so, provided that r is su ciently large.
We start with two simple remarks: Hence, each entry of s 1 has zero mean and a variance equal to 2E(s 2 1 3. Compute the gcd of all these dot products and check whether it is q ? 1.
In practice, only Step 1 takes a little time. Note that the server only needs to store the i] p 's and the i] q 's (not even the signatures) to run the attack.
Experiments
We implemented the attack using the NTL package 15] which includes e cient lattice-reduction algorithms. We used the LLL oating point version with extended exponent to compute orthogonal lattices, since the entries of p were too large (about the size of n) for the usual oating point version. In practice, the attack reveals the secret factorization as soon as r (the number of signatures) is large enough, and the total computation time is less than 5 minutes on a UltraSparc-I clocked at 167 MHz, when r is less than 70. It actually takes more time to generate the signatures along with the di erent parameters than to recover the factorization. The following table shows the practical number of RSA signatures which are necessary to make the attack successful, for di erent key sizes and choices of parameters. When r reaches these values, at least the 10 shortest vectors of the reduced basis are also orthogonal to s 1 . Generally, 5 of them are enough to reveal q?1.
When r is larger, most of the vectors of the reduced basis are very short and have similar norms, and their dot product with q is a non-zero multiple of q ? 1 . As previously, we only need a few of them to discover the factorization.
Conclusion
We presented a simple passive attack against the B eguin-Quisquater server-aided RSA protocol. It is based on the basic notion of an orthogonal lattice. This notion was introduced as a useful tool in a paper published last year, which cryptanalyzed a knapsack-like cryptosystem proposed by Qu and Vanstone. We applied this technique in a di erent manner, but the success of our attack relies on the main property of orthogonal lattices as well: given a low-dimensional lattice, one can easily nd many short and linearly independent vectors in the corresponding orthogonal lattice. The attack has been implemented, and is devastating in practice, for all the choices of parameters suggested by B eguin and Quisquater. Once the card has produced about 50 signatures, the server can quickly recover the secret factorization of the RSA key, without storing much information. This shows that the B eguin-Quisquater server-aided RSA protocol is not secure, and stresses the importance of provable security as opposed to security against all known attacks. The existence of a server-aided RSA signature protocol which is both e cient (without requiring expensive precomputations) and provably secure against passive and active attacks remains open.
